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THE COMING NORTH AMERICAN RAIL MERGERS(a)
In 2003 two steam generators, each weighing approximately 500
tons and 73 feet in length, were shipped from Cambridge, Ontario
to Duke Energy’s nuclear power plant in Seneca, S.C. The
shipment was by ocean, rail and highway using special equipment
for all three modes. No government bureaucrat, politician, or
special interest group decided by what means the shipment would
be made. Economic efficiency was the single consideration with
each mode contributing its unique capabilities. What efficiencies
and savings can only be dreamed of if such were the case for all
freight moving over the U.S. transportation system.
In June of 2001 the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB) (1) proposed new rules
governing rail mergers in the United States. Under the old rules merging firms were required to
show that the proposed merger(s) would preserve competition; under the new rules merging
roads had to show how the merger(s) would, in effect, increase competition. (2) In essence, the
STB’s position is that from June 2001 all proposed rail mergers will be considered anticompetitive, i.e. that there are no remaining economic efficiencies to be gained by further rail
mergers. In a legal sense, the burden of proof was on the merging roads to show how the
merger would enhance competition in addition to bestowing economic benefits on the nation as
a whole.(a)
The practical effect of the proposed regulations is to encourage alliances and cooperative
agreements among railroads rather than mergers.
This paper takes the position that the proposed new regulations inhibit railroad efficiency at a
time when new highway construction and maintenance, and construction and maintenance of
other transport systems infrastructures, are hard pressed to keep pace with an increasing demand
for transportation services. Argued is that the proposed 2001 STB ruling should be relaxed to
allow for a final set of mergers involving Class I railroads. Cited below are three arguments in
support of this position.
1. Rail mergers would not lessen competition but would increase rail economic efficiency
and overall efficiency of the U. S. transportation system.
2. Railroad capacity/capability is under-utilized in North America, especially in the United
States.
3. Railroad mergers are economically more efficient than railroad alliances and cooperative
agreements.
(a)

There is roughly a spread of three years in the data cited in this report, i. e., 2001-03. However, any
differences as between data in 2001, 2002, and 2003 do not invalidate conclusions reached in the report.
Historically, transportation statistics lag publication dates between 1-3 years. Such is the case here.

Background
From passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887 till the 1970s, when Congress passed
several railroad reform acts, the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate
virtually every economic aspect of rail operations was uncontested. The most far reaching
legislation during this period was the Transportation Act of 1920. So comprehensive was this
legislation with respect to railroad activities that if reviewed by a family court judge today, he
could fairly state that American railroads were now under the fostering guardianship and
direction of the ICC. (3) This act could be considered the historical high mark of government
regulation of railroads in the United States.
From the end of World War II through the 1970s, railroads, in particular those in the Northeast,
suffered huge operating losses. There were a number of bankruptcies culminating with the
bankruptcy of the Penn Central in 1970. Several reasons are cited for the financial plight of U.S.
railroads during this period. The first was ICC enforcement of highly restrictive federal
economic regulations including a tight control over rail mergers. The second was massive
government expenditures on air, highway, and inland waterway infrastructure. e.g., the National
Defense and Interstate Highway System. Last, railroads faced growing competition from other
modes, particularly motor carriers and airlines.
During the 30 years following the end of World War II, federal expenditures on the “path”
component of the U.S. highway system, the air transportation system, and inland waterways and
ports approximated $115 billion. (4)
By the 1960s more Americans were traveling by common carrier buses and airplanes than by
rail, which until then had been the dominant mode of inter-city passenger transportation. At the
same time, common carrier and for hire trucks replaced railroads as the preferred mode of intercity freight transportation. Add in the fact that railroads were the most regulated of all U.S.
industry groups, the bankruptcy of 40 percent of the nation’s rail system and average rates of
return on investment of less than two percent for the remaining roads was hardly surprising.
One area of regulation often cited as a major reason for past railroad operating losses was the
ICC’s strict control over rail mergers. Table 1 documents rail legislation with respect to the size
of rail firms 1887-1980.
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TABLE 1
RAIL REGULATIONS AFFECTING FIRM SIZE 1871-1980b

Dates

Legislation and Size Provisions

1871-86
1887-1920

State (Granger) laws. Generally against consolidation
Act to Regulate Commerce 1887; Hepburn Act 1906; Mann-Elkins Act 1910
dealt with rates, discrimination, pooling of freight and equipment, authority to
suspend rates. No specific sections respecting rail size. The 1887 legislation
created an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to oversee (administer)
federal laws respecting railroads.
1920
Transportation Act of 1920. ICC given authority to control rail expansion, i.e.
line extensions; control over rail abandonments. ICC tasked to develop a
consolidation plan for all U.S. railroads. Concept was to combine weak roads
with strong roads. Rail firm participation voluntary. Generally speaking, if
two railroads wanted to merge, merger must conform to plan. Idea of a master
plan abandoned in 1940s.
1920-62
Rail consolidations reviewed by ICC on a case by case basis. A number of
mergers were approved under this procedure. However, procedure was very
time consuming. In 1962 the Pennsylvania and New York Central submitted
an application to merge; final approval was in 1966.
1970
Rail Passenger Act of 1970. Railroads allowed to shed passenger services if
they agreed to a federally created rail passenger system (AMTRAK) by
contributing equipment and funds.
1972
Penn-Central asks ICC for permission to abandon 9,000 miles of track.
Permission refused.
1973
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973: Railway Association created to
organize bankrupt northeastern roads into a single system (CONRAIL) New
system had 3200 less route miles than the combined route miles of the
bankrupt roads.
1976
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. ICC given a
31 month time limit to approve/ disapprove mergers. Time shortened for ICC
to consider requests for abandonments. Principle established that railroads
were not required to provide money-losing services. Secretary of
Transportation instructed to facilitate proposed rail mergers.
(b)
While this paper is primarily concerned with rail mergers, laws dealing with
abandonments and new construction are also cited. Argued is that abandonments and new
construction are opposite sides of the same coin since, like mergers, they affect the final
size of the rail network.

3

The Staggers Rail Act of 1980
In 1980 the Staggers Rail Act was signed into law. It significantly relaxed federal economic
regulation of railroads. Under this legislation carriers were given more freedom to set rates,
abandonment criteria was liberalized, and following the general thrust of the Act (less
regulation), rail mergers were viewed more sympathetically. There were, of course, major rail
mergers before passage of the Staggers Act, but the largest and those with the most impact,
occurred in the 20 years since its passage. Table 2 documents major North American rail mergers
after 1980.

TABLE 2
MAJOR NORTH AMERICAN RAIL MERGERS, 1980-2001

Year
1980
1980
1982
1982
1982
1985
1985
1991
1995
1995
1996
1998
1998
2001

Merger Partners (Merged Name in Italics)
Burlington Northern and St. Louis- San Francisco (Burlington Northern)
Seaboard Coast Line, Chesapeake and Ohio, and Baltimore and Ohio
(CSX)
Louisville and Nashville and CSX (CSX)
Union Pacific, Western Pacific, Missouri Pacific (Union Pacific)
Southern Railway and Norfolk and Western
(Norfolk Southern)
Southern Pacific and St. Louis South-Western (Southern Pacific)
Union Pacific and Missouri-Kansas and Texas (Union Pacific)
Southern Pacific and Denver & Rio Grande (Southern Pacific)
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
(Burlington Northern)
Union Pacific and Chicago and North-Western (Union Pacific)
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific
(Union Pacific)
Norfolk Southern, 58% of CONRAIL
(Norfolk Southern)
CSX and 42% of CONRAIL
(CSX Transportation)
Canadian National and the Wisconsin Central (Canadian National)
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The Players
As so amply demonstrated by history, future rail mergers will not only involve the proposed
merger partners but many other “players” with a stake in the game including NAFTA
transportation entities in Canada and Mexico. A non exhaustive list of players include:
* Major North American Railroads
* North American Short Line Railroads
* North American common carrier and private trucking firms.
* North American domestic water carriers, including Great Lakes shipping and coastwise
ocean carriage.
* Pipelines
* Employees/unions of railroad, waterway, trucking, and pipeline firms.
* North American shippers and their associations.
* Administrations, legislatures, and bureaucracies of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.
In the last quarter of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century it could be fairly
argued that railroads were in fact, monopolies in many areas of the country that were not served
by existing navigable rivers and lakes or coastal ocean shipping. With the coming of motor
vehicles, the U.S. numbered highway system, the interstate highway system, the Panama Canal,
(5) thousands of miles of improved domestic waterways, including the St. Lawrence Seaway
project and the Intercoastal Waterway System, allowing double bottom trucks on major
highways, the rapid technological improvement of aircraft to a point where air freight is a multibillion dollar industry, and the rapid expansion of oil and gas pipeline capacity, the assertion,
when made, that railroads still retain enormous monopoly power with respect to the total U.S.
transportation system is simply not sustainable. Unfortunately old concepts and arguments die
hard in large part because “monopoly” is a pejorative term and not above being used by
particular interest groups to further their own agendas.
Table 3 shows the “path” component of the different U.S. transport modes in miles. The path
is a major consideration in determining whether and where a transportation monopoly exists.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 profile the transport industries that would be primarily involved in a final
set of North American rail mergers followed by a summary of the roles played by airlines and
pipelines in the context of the total U.S. transportation system.

5

TABLE 3

PATH COMPONENT OF THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Industry
Motor Carriers
Pipelines
Oil
Natural Gas
U.S. Airlines

RAILROADS
Domestic Water Carriers

Total Miles of Path
3,948,335 miles
200,000 miles
206,000 miles
Practically infinite considering the hundreds of airports
serving North American cities and the thousands of
airports serving smaller cities and urban areas.
143,000 miles (Class I 99,797 miles)
25,777 miles (Primary system is 11,000 miles)
TABLE 4

THE NORTH AMERICAN RAILROAD INDUSTRY 2001
Number of all types of railroads
600 (U.S. 571)
Miles of road operated by freight railroads
170,161 (U.S. 143,361)
(less trackage rights)
Total revenues earned
$42 billion (U.S. $36.6 billion)
Total number of employees
225,061 (U.S. 184,369)
Railroad
Revenue ($ mil. U.S.)
Route Miles (Approx.)
BNSF (U, S,)
9,201
33,000
CN (Canada)
3,650
18,382
CP (Canada)
2,386
13,893
CSX TRANS (U.S.)
6,454
23,000
FXE (Mexico)
557
6,485
KSC (U.S.)
566
6,000
NS (U.S.)
6,170
21,500
TFM (Mexico)
668
2,677
UP (U.S.)
10,614
33,500
Rail share of domestic intercity freight revenue
9.50%
Rail share of all domestic freight revenue
6.30%
Rail share of U.S. inter-city ton-miles moved
42.00%
Average rate of return on net investment (all roads)
7.00%
Class I railroads
7.96%
Class I railroads, median return on equity (2002)
8.70%
Average return on equity of five largest U.S. railroads (2003)
7.50%
Source: American Association of Railroads, Policy and Economics Department
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TABLE 5
U.S. TRUCKING INDUSTRY 2001
Total Number of Trucking Establishments
General Freight
General Freight, Long Distance
Total Miles of Highway
Interstate and Expressways
Arterial
Collector and Local
Total Revenues Earned
Total Number of Employees
Ten Largest For-Hire Companies
Motor Carrier

109,814
56,378
20,726
3,948,335
55,593
379,790
3,512,952
$130 billion(est.)
1,398,000
Revenue ($ million U.S.)

United Parcel Service Trucking
FedEx Ground
Roadway Express
Yellow Freight
Schneider National
Sirva, Inc.
J.B. Hunt Transport
Consolidated Freightways
FedEx Freight
Con-Way Transportation Service

$20,313
2,711
2,642
2,465
2,388
2,249
2,100
2,052
1,960
1,854
Motor Carrier Share of Domestic Freight
84%
Motor Carrier Share of Domestic Freight, Ton-Miles
28%
Industry Average Return on Equity
19.86%
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (2003); Commercial Carrier Journal (August 2002);
Yahoo Financial (2004)
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TABLE 6
THE U.S. WATERWAY INDUSTRY 2001
Total Number of Establishments
Ocean, Great Lakes, Coastal
Inland Freight
Total Miles of Waterway
Significant for Domestic Commerce
Total Revenues Earned
Total Number of Employees
Ships
Coastal
Inland Waterway
Great Lakes

1,227
644
25,777
11,000
$27.6 Billion
125,000
953
1,634
52

Ten Largest U.S. Inland Water Carriers
Company
American Commercial Lines
American River Transportation Co
Central Gulf Lines
Cargill Marine and Terminal
Crounse Corporation
American Electric Power River
Canal Barge Company
Bienge Corportation
Alter Barge Line
Campell Transportation Company

Number of Powered/Unpowered Vessels
3, 752*
2, 217
842
782
755
669
510
492
460
450

*Operating Revenue in 2001 was $788, 501, 000. Other inland water carrier revenue not
available.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 2003, Tables Nos
1056, 1057, 1072, pp. 681, 682, 689; U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Civil Works Office and
Missions (Navigation).
Airlines and pipelines are relatively new players in the U.S. transportation system. Air freight
as an important component of the system could be said to date from the introduction of widebodied aircraft such as the Boeing 747 and the DC 10, planes not only capable of carrying
containerized cargo but having increased range and speed which made them competitors in the
movement of high value, medium weight cargo. (6) As for light-weight, fast delivery, high value
freight, advances in computer and communication technology, coupled with advanced aircraft
design, insured the formation and success of multi-billion carriers such as FedEx and UPS. With
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extensive ground transport capability, large air freight firms have increased their market share of
freight that once moved exclusively over rails and highways.
One interesting trend is the use of rail by large air/ground freight carriers for ground
movements over medium distances. This trend from truck to rail can be expected to continue as
highways become more congested.
Although the concept of moving liquids through pipelines dates back to the early 19th century,
pipelines were not major players in the U.S. transport system until the United States entered
World War II. In 1941 the movement of oil from fields in Louisiana and Texas to refineries in
the Northeast was by coastal tankers. It soon became apparent that this was a poor option as
German submarines took an increasing toll of this shipping. To avoid such losses the federal
government underwrote the construction of an extensive pipeline network as an alternative mode
of transport. For the same reason—to avoid shipping losses—the government extended and
improved the intercoastal waterway system.
Pipelines compete with railroads, trucks, domestic ocean shipping, and inland water carriers in
the movement of petroleum products in an increasing number of markets. Pipelines are also
capable of moving solid products. e.g. coal slurry pipelines. According to the Association of Oil
Pipelines (AOPL), petroleum pipelines move 66 percent of ton-miles of oil transported annually
followed in order by water, truck and rail. Also noted is that oil pipelines transport 17 percent of
all U.S. freight account for only two percent of the nation’s freight bill. (7) Also noted is that
pipelines are safe and environmentally friendly. However, unlike railroads which have the
capability to expand by using existing right of ways, pipelines, like highways, depend on
acquiring land or land easements to serve new markets. In rural areas there is generally little
environmental and/or social impact, while in urban areas land acquisitions can be costly and
contentious.
Argued here is that air and pipeline transport firms will be interested observers with marginal
interests in the coming last set of North American rail mergers. Down the road, however, their
roles as transport alternatives are less clear. Technological improvements in all modes of
transport are not only probable but certain, which makes predicting a particular industry’s
competitors highly speculative.
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Arguments For A Final Set of North American Rail Mergers
Rail mergers would not lessen competition but would increase rail economic efficiency and
overall efficiency of the U.S. transportation system
This argument can be addressed by logic as well as data. In this respect, in 1939 there were
132 Class I railroads in the United States. In 2002 there are seven. In 1945 miles of road operated
(including passenger roads) was 226,696. As shown in Table 3 in 2001 this mileage has been
almost halved to 143,361 excluding passenger trackage. What was the result?
Average rates of return on investment increased from an average two percent in 1975 to 7% in
2001. Ton miles moved by railroads increased from 597 billion in 1950 to 1.507 trillion in 2002.
Other indicators of increased railroad efficiencies include large, across the board gains in
productivity. e.g., ton-miles moved per gallon of fuel, ton-miles moved per employee and tonmiles moved per constant dollar operating expense. The above data is a matter of record. And not
to be overlooked is that these gains came about during a period when merger activity was at its
zenith, particularly since passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of
1976 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.
To urge that further rail efficiencies cannot be created by further rail mergers defies logic.
During the years since passage of the Staggers Rail Act, literally thousands of mergers have been
proposed or have taken place in other sectors of the economy. (8) Most have come to fruition,
others denied for various reasons but never have merger critics argued that there is a point in a
growing economy where mergers, per se, cause inefficiencies. (9)
The STB’s conclusion that railroads need to “ take a breather” with respect to more mergers is
reminiscent of the arrogance of the now defunct ICC. In this regard, how long is a “breather” in a
dynamic, multi-trillion dollar economy? The STB’s argument that shippers and the industry have
not yet recovered from previous mergers seems to imply that rail mergers must be seamless
before passing government muster. Its concern that a merger between two major railroads would
lead to other mergers, if nothing more, demonstrates a misunderstanding of how the marketplace
works. In this regard, the time to worry would be if no follow on mergers were proposed. The
STB’s concern that there are only six major U.S. railroads (actually there are five in 2003) is
reminiscent of earlier monopoly fears about there being only three major automobile makers in
the United States. Time has embarrassingly proved these critics wrong. In the case of railroads,
the industry has more competitors than enough—trucks, inland water transport, air transport,
domestic ocean shipping, and pipelines.
As for the overall efficiency of the U. S. transport system, consider the following:
*Railroads are 2-4 times more fuel efficient per ton-mile moved than trucks. It has been
reasonably argued that if only 10 percent of freight moved on highways were diverted to
railroads, the gallons of fuel saved would be in hundreds of millions.
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*Per ton-mile traveled, trucks emit 4-8 times more pollutants than railroads. Less pollutants
translates into environmental savings that can be used to improve transport infrastructure or for
other general purposes.
*Movement by rail decreases highway congestion thereby making the overall highway system
more efficient. At a minimum, one freight train is capable of moving an amount of freight that
could take a hundred or more trucks off the nation’s highways.
*Railroads are the most adaptable and flexible of all transport modes. A single train can move
containers, highway trailers, bulk products (liquid and solid) in tank cars, general freight in
boxcars, and highway and rail capable in “roadrailers.” Special freight cars can handle a variety
of outsize freight. This capability has the potential to further reduce highway congestion by
adding or subtracting different kinds of cars on a single train as demand warrants.
*Railroads are land-economical when their right of ways are contrasted with the ROW
required for major highways.
Argument #2 states that railroad capacity/capability is under-utilized in North America,
especially in the United States. In this respect:
Railroads have the ability to increase path capacity by double tracking on existing right of
ways. A reasonable estimate is that 50-60 percent of rail right of way, excluding yards, is unused,
i.e., is single track. Such cannot be said for the country’s highway system with its greater and
greater demand for high value real estate that must be condemned and paid for with taxpayer
dollars in order to expand two lane highways to four then to six, then to eight with no end in
sight.
While railroads are essentially land conservation friendly, many, if not all, of the major rail
carriers face congestion problems at major terminals and transfer points along their lines. Thus,
while train speeds are approaching highway speeds on main lines, average transit time between
origin and destination is significantly degraded if the movement must pass through large
terminals and/ or transfer points. Trucks face a similar problem but not on the scale faced by
railroads. While the problems on their face seem to be similar, the route to solutions is quite
different.
The congested path that leads to the truck terminal entrance, be it a city street, a state road or
interstate highway, is publicly owned. It follows that the capital required to relieve the
congestion must come from tax revenues. In this respect, the trucking industry has a powerful
ally---the motoring public. The reason is simple. Highway/street congestion in cities where truck
terminals are located affects the automobile owner as well as the truck operator. In time, public
pressure will insure the availability of the needed capital. Not so with railroads, the congested
path that leads to the rail terminal is privately owned. The capital to alleviate this congestion
must come from the railroads.
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Argument #3. Railroad mergers are economically more efficient than railroad alliances and
cooperative agreements.
If increased rail efficiencies, as noted earlier, occurred in a period when mergers were
encouraged by the Staggers Act of 1980 (Section 228), then it would seem difficult to argue that
additional mergers would somehow degrade overall rail efficiency.
Railroads for many years have had the option of entering into cooperative agreements with
other roads, i.e. trackage and haulage rights. In fact, the Transportation Act of 1920 mandated
cooperation in a number of areas including consolidations and cross subsidies. Such agreements,
however, including federal loan guarantees, were unable to prevent the collapse and bankruptcy
of 40 percent of the U.S. rail capacity in the 1960s and 70s.
It has been stated that 75 percent of strategic alliances and partnerships fail. (10) Grant that a
high percent of proposed alliances and partnerships never come to fruition and that many that
take place ultimately fail. Also grant that many mergers fail. Can then an argument be made that
one option is preferred over the other?
One argument in favor of mergers is that “uncertainty” respecting future actions and options of
the merged parties is reduced. And while mergers, like a marriage between a man and woman,
can be dissolved, many uncertainties in their relationship are eliminated. This is not to say,
however, that some uncertainties are not reduced by alliances and cooperative agreements, only
that there is less uncertainty in a merger.
Uncertainty is the bane of any business whether it be economic, political or social. Assuming
that stock markets are a fair measure of the economic outlook for corporate America, then one
only need observe the effect on these markets when the future is more uncertain rather than less.
The eminent economist, Frank Knight, dealt extensively with the concept of uncertainty in
economics and by extension in business. He cites several ways in which uncertainty can be
reduced. Among them are control of the future and increased power of prediction (11) both of
which would seem to favor mergers over cooperative agreements.
Is there, however, a counter argument that makes the case for cooperative agreements rather
than mergers? One might be that it is easier to exit a failed agreement that a failed merger which
is unquestionably true. The only response to this observation is to look at the track record of rail
mergers since passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. Fourteen mergers (Table 2) have taken place,
none of these have failed while admitting that major problems did initially occur in some of
them. The key point, however, is that the problems were solved and that these merged companies
comprise the backbone of the North American rail network.
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Likely Non-Government Objections to a Final Set
of North American Rail Mergers
Perhaps, surprisingly, when two railroads propose a merger the loudest and most sustained
objections often come from railroads that perceive their financial and market interests threatened.
In some cases, absent regulatory interference, the aggrieved carriers can be accommodated by
granting haulage and trackage rights. In other cases, however, disputes are long and bitter;
witness the recent case of CSX and Norfolk Southern’s fight to which road should purchase
CONRAIL and for how much. Recent mergers between U.S. western roads were only slightly
less contentious.
Another player that can be expected to carefully monitor and, when necessary, weigh in with
political pressure when its interests, i.e., jobs, are threatened by a merger are the railroad unions.
A case in point is the reaction of rail unions to an earlier Norfolk Southern attempt to acquire
complete control of CONRAIL in 1984. Since the then sale of CONRAIL required the approval
of Congress, both the House of Representative and the Senate had to agree to the sale. (12) The
Senate approved. The House disapproved largely because of objections raised by rail unions. In
some cases, rail unions can be satisfied with job guarantees or job buy-outs as was the case with
the Penn-Central mergers in 1968.
Other objections can come from rail shippers, in particular, bulk shippers such as coal, grain
and chemicals. Their complaint would generally cite the “market dominance” of the merged
carriers should the merger take place and the expectation that this dominance would lead to
unreasonable rail rates in the future. In the past, many bulk rail customers have not been satisfied
with the merged carrier granting trackage/haulage rights to competing railroads to insure
competition and have lobbied Congress for greater rail shipper protection. This was particularly
true immediately following the mergers of UP/SP and NS/CSX split of CONRAIL and continues
to the present day.
Under current regulations a shipper cannot bring a rate reasonableness case to the STB unless
(a) the rate exceeds 180 percent of the revenue to variable cost ratio for a particular commodity
and (b) an absence of effective competition. (13) However, should the STB determine a rate
unreasonable it still could not reduce the rate below the 180 percent threshold. If a rate above the
180 percent level is allowed, the shipper must demonstrate that no effective competition exists
and the rate should be declared unreasonable. It is then incumbent on the railroad to show that
competition does exist. Essentially, the protection for the so-called “captive shipper” has
remained unchanged since passage of the Staggers Act.
In the period FY 1998-FY 2001 the STB acted on eleven major rate complaints with respect to
market dominance and rate reasonableness from rail shippers. It ruled in favor of the shipper in
three cases; the remaining eight were dismissed. (14) If, in fact, there was abuse by market
dominant rail carriers, one would expect more then eleven complaints in three years.
Nonetheless, rail dependent shippers can be expected to continuously press for ‘rail reform
legislation,’ individually and collectively through their trade associations. This has been the case
since the mid 1800s and no doubt will continue on into the 21st century.
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Under certain circumstances the viability of short line railroads can be significantly threatened
by a merger of major carriers in the region served by the short line. (15) This is particularly true
when the distance between origin and destination is considerably reduced after a merger in an
area where a short line held a prior distance advantage. As a general rule, when the distance
between origin and destination after the merger is in the 50-75 mile range, trucks can usually
compete with the merged railroad.
Should, however, a proposed rail merger cause trucking and/or water carriers to abandon a
particular market, thus removing an element of competition, the STB would, undoubtedly,
consider the possibility of market dominance. Historically, when making the case for a rail
merger, the principals often time cite water, truck and pipelines as alternative transport modes.
A lengthy and well-researched study "Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers" published in
2001 concluded:
That the ability of railroads to raise prices is restricted if the shippers in the area have
access to at least two railroads (and) that railroad mergers do not necessarily increase
railroad market power or make railroad shippers worse off. Instead…the impact of
railroad mergers on shippers depends on factors that vary geographically, such as the
degree of competition between railroads and intermodal competition. (16)
A less favorable view of railroad mergers was contained in a March 2000 paper written by
Louis S. Thompson, Railway Adviser to the World Bank. He concluded that the mergers of
UP/SP and NS/CSX split of CONRAIL were “near disasters in operational and financial terms.”
He also considered the possibility of two major railroads in the United States as a “threat.”
Unstated was a “threat” to who and what. (17)
Nowhere in this report is it suggested that a final set of North American rail mergers would
usher in a modern day renaissance for the railroad industry; or insure a competitive return on
equity; or internally generate the capital needed in a capital intense industry.
What is suggested is that a North American network of financially strong roads, capable of
internally generating sufficient revenues for capital expenses, will improve efficiency in the
entire North American transportation system; that improved transport efficiency will positively
effect the economic growth of NAFA nations and at the same time make NAFTA firms more
competitive firms worldwide.
The primary reason for suggesting mergers as a first step is that it would be accomplished
intra-industry without federal funding in a period of multi-billion federal deficits with no definite
end in sight and an era of a crumbling highway system heavily dependent on government
support.
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Return On Equity (ROE)
In 2004 railroads neither earned a competitive ROE or ROI. (18) If it is granted that this is a
long-term problem and must be addressed, what are the options?
*Nationalization? Hardly, the move worldwide is toward privatization, not government
ownership.
*Separate ownership of the “path” and the transporter? Would there be one path or several?
Would the path(s) be privately or government owned? Would the railroads voluntarily acquiesce
to such a scheme. Not likely, with expectations of court battles lasting over decades.
*Operating subsidies and management restrictions such as found in the Merchant Marine of
1936? (19) Given Congressional aversion, if not hostility, to continuing subsidies for AMTRAK,
direct subsidies to any transportation mode is not a realistic possibility.
*Continuing the status quo as implied by the STB’s ruling on the BNSF/CN merger. While
one or two roads might remain financially viable in the long run as defined below, most would
not. In this respect the median return on equity for Class I railroads between 1985 and 2002 was
7.49 percent while the median ROE for Fortune 500 companies in the same period was 12.84
percent. (20) Fifteen percent is the market place expected return for American industry in
general. The average return on equity for the five major U.S. railroads in 2003 as 7.5 percent,
ranging between 6.6 percent (CSX) and 13.3 percent (UP). (21)
Economic theory holds that a viable firm should at least earn the opportunity cost of its
capital, that is, the average return if the capital were invested elsewhere. Today that would
include the global economy, not just the American economy. Since passage of the Staggers Act
in 1980, North American railroads have failed to earn the opportunity cost of their capital. On
average, America’s manufacturing sector allocates between 3-6 percent of revenues for capital
expenditures contrasted to railroads between 15-20 percent.
In a book published in 1983 by the Brookings Institution, Theodore Keeler suggests a railroad
earning a 9 percent ROI (return on net investment) is a viable firm even though it is not earning
the opportunity cost of it invested capital. Firms in the 7-9 percent range are considered
marginally viable; in the 4-7 percent range firms are not considered viable under existing
structure and regulations. Under 4 percent, firms are having serious financial problems, and
under 2 percent either bankrupt or in some way subsidized by government. e.g. CONRAIL for
the first ten years of its existence. (22) In 2004 there is nothing to suggest that Keeler’s
classification is not still valid.
From 1980 to 2001 there were fourteen mergers between major railroads. During this same
period average railroad return on equity increased from under 4 percent to 7.2 percent.
Finally, assigning weight to independent variables in an equation is always a risky undertaking
although several statistical procedures make the effort. Said another way, to what extent were rail
mergers responsible for an increase in ROE over this 11 year period, granting that other factors
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also contributed to this gain? While no definitive answer is possible, it can hardly be denied that
rail mergers played an important part.

Multimodal Transportation Companies
In 1978 the American Enterprise Institute (Washington, D.C.) sponsored a one-day conference
on “Forming Multimodal Transportation Companies: Barriers, Benefits and Problems.”
Conference participants represented all transport modes, shippers, labor, government officials,
and members of Congress. Points of view were as divergent as the conferees. In general,
railroads and ocean carriers favored multimodal ownership, not surprisingly since these two
modes fathered modern day intermodalism. Truckers were generally opposed; inland water
carriers noted that there were minimal barriers to rail ownership of inland water carriers but
should that occur, there should be anti-trust safeguards. Air freight participants believed there
were some combinations of different modes that would benefit but offered no overall objection
to the concept.
Shippers expressed various viewpoints none of which were hostile to the multimodal concept.
As one shipper put it, it is a “ho-hum” issue. Freight forwarders complained about regulations
that restricted them from direct ownership of motor carriers. A large Washington, D. C. law firm
representing several transport unions believed there would be winners and loser with respect to
employment and that any move toward lowering bars to multimodal ownership must provide for
individual employee protection. The representative of the Teamsters Union stated his
organization had an open mind with respect to multimodal companies but was nevertheless
keenly interested in the concept. (23)
What has changed or hasn’t changed in the 26 years since the AEI conference, or in the 37
years since U.S. News and World Report ran the story “Trucks, Trains, Planes and Boats All In
One Company?”
The three most proactive railroads with respect to multimodal companies—Southern, now
Norfolk Southern, CSX and Canadian Pacific—acquired, then shed their non-rail modes. Norfolk
Southern sold North American Van Lines while CSX and CP both split off their ocean carriers.
(24) Although North American railroads still have non-rail subsidiaries, their fascination with
multimodal ownership has dimmed.
A likely reason for loss of interest by railroads in the period 1975-95 was their low rates of
return on equity/investment. Railroads discovered they could not afford to invest in a non-rail
mode that might take years before being fully integrated into the rail system and make a
competitive contribution to the bottom line. In some cases, it was simply a poor fit with respect
to the existing rail system. In others, it was a need for operating cash. Argued here is that a final
set of rail mergers would result in larger firms with greater financial strength and staying power,
a necessary condition to a successful rail based multimodal transportation company.
If a final set of rail mergers is proposed and agreed upon, would multimodal ownership again
become attractive? The answer depends on the extent of competition in the merger proposal. If
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competition is lacking or unclear, merger opponents could make a strong case against the
proposal and likely cause it to fail.
One way to insure competition is through multimodal ownership, not just by railroads, but
throughout the entire North American transportation system. The growing market share of air
freight carriers and their ground subsidiaries is a good example of successful multimodal
ownership in 2004.

Parameters
If the 2000 BNSF-CN merger had been approved, a likely follow on merger would have been
UP and CP which would have created two trans-continental roads. Since the remaining three
major roads—Norfolk Southern, CSX and KCS—are Eastern roads there would be no possibility
of forming a third trans-continental carrier, while a defensive merger of CSX, NS and KCS
would raise questions of market dominance east of the Mississippi. A merger between two of
the three would have been opposed by the left out carrier and probably would not have passed
Department of Justice (DOJ) and STB muster. The likelihood of market dominance would also
rule out any mergers between eastern roads or a merger between western roads, either including
or excluding KCS. With respect to a CN-CP merger the Canadian government would never
allow it to occur since it would void a historic policy of mandating competition between the two
roads.
The remaining option is the creation of two major railroads serving the United States and
Canada with equal access to Mexico’s FXE and TFM. Major emphasis would be on negotiating
trackage/haulage rights to the degree necessary to insure that shippers had several viable
transport options. (25)
Rail unions would strenuously oppose a two-railroad proposal citing, correctly, loss of jobs.
Inland waterway carriers would move from indifference to active interest. Truckers would be
uncompromisingly hostile. Oil and natural gas pipelines, several already multimodal
transportation companies, might object in specific instances but more likely see an opportunity
for expansion. Short line railroads, not included in the final rail map, would have to be
compensated. The STB could be expected to make a prolonged and detailed case for continuing
the status quo, that is, favor agreements between railroads for trackage/haulage rights rather than
mergers. Every Congressional district would have its own demands to be satisfied. And if a final
set of mergers seemed likely, proposals would be for the STB define the rail map rather than a
rail map negotiated by the carriers. (26)
Given the above, which is not an exhaustive list of likely objections and objectors, is pursuing
a final set of rail mergers worth the time and effort that would have to be expended while all the
time recognizing the high probability of failure?
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Conclusion
In 2004 the United States has one of the world’s best transportation systems. But can it be
maintained and expanded to meet future demands with government, directly and indirectly,
supporting four of the six major transport modes, i.e., highway, air, inland water and domestic
ocean carriers while leaving railroad financing to the marketplace? Is this in the best long-term
interest of the system as a whole? What is not needed is re-regulation of railroads as practiced
under the Transportation Act of 1920 and later legislation or operational subsidies (Merchant
Marine Act of 1936) at the price of strict government control of otherwise market place
decisions. What is needed is a continuation of deregulation as begun with passage of the
Staggers Act of 1980.
Creating the necessary conditions for rail expansion is not a complicated matter. The first task
is to end the threat of re-regulation of railroads. Second, Congress should give a fair hearing to
the concept of a final set of North American rail mergers through hearings and/or requesting a
General Accounting Office review of the concept. Third, should such prove necessary, institute a
program of loan guarantees for specific rail capital projects to improve system efficiency. e.g.
modernize terminal facilities in major rail hubs. A present major rail deficiency is the time
freight spends in terminals and transfer points.
In 2004 metropolitan areas are scrambling to meet stricter EPA air quality standards and avoid
the harsh penalties for failure. Many regional planners consider building light rail systems as a
way to reduce emissions from automobiles. Relatively few, however, suggest that pollution
could be significantly reduced by removing trucks from the highways.
By 2025 or before, the country with a larger population and an economy to match, will be
much more dependent on its transport infrastructure than it is today. Adding to a 4 million mile
highway system by expanding 2 lanes to 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 12 and beyond, or creating inland
seaports on the inland waterway system that cannot be justified by any reasonable cost-benefit
analysis, is hardly the best use of scarce resources.
This report is controversial, as intended. Its central message is for federal and state
governments to examine the country’s transportation system from an overall point of view, not
narrowly as is the present case. The authors believe that should this occur, railroads will be
recognized as an under utilized transport asset and one that can substantially contribute to future
transportation demands.
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NOTES
(1) The ICC Termination Act of 1995 (Public Law No. 104-88, Stat. 803 (1995) removed a
number of restrictive rail regulations administered by the ICC. Remaining regulatory functions
were transferred to the Surface Transportation Board.
(2) On its face, this new rule challenges the main purpose of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 which
was to create an environment conducive to achieving an economically efficient, stable and
profitable rail system in the United States. The new rule came about after an appellate court
upheld an earlier STB 15-month moratorium on new rail mergers following a proposed
Burlington Northern Santa Fe-Canadian National merger. The merger was later called off by
both roads citing that the delays and uncertainty should the merger be pressed were not in their
shareholders' best interest.
(3) Provisions of 1920 Act. (a) ICC has authority to determine return on railroad investment.
Rates were to reflect this fair return. (b) Recapture clause. If a railroad earned more than 6%, one
half of overage into a railroad contingency fund, other half into an ICC contingency fund from
which loans could be mead to weak railroads. (c) ICC given authority to establish minimum
rates. (d) ICC instructed to prepare a national plan for railroad consolidation, i.e., railroads could
request mergers if merger within the proposed system; ICC to specify number of systems. (e)
ICC could require intrastate rates be raised if it considered them too low, i.e., discriminatory. (f)
Carriers can pool freight and equipment with ICC permission.(g) Railroads could not issue
securities without ICC permission.(h). ICC given control over abandonments and new
construction. (i) ICC given authority to compel a carrier to share its facilities; carriers to receive
a reasonable compensation.
(4) The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 initially provided
approximately $5 billion in federal grants and subsidies to mainly weak railroads, including $2
billion for CONRAIL.
(5) The Panama Canal Act of 1912 forbade railroads from owning/controlling inter-coastal
shipping firms and inland water carriers that competed with railroads. The concern was that
railroads would use these acquisitions to create transportation monopolies in the areas served.
(6) The U, S, Air Force was a pioneer in building large air freighters with the introduction of the
C-5 Galaxy in 1970. The C-5 is capable of lifting 270, 000 pounds at a speed of 518 mph. With
the follow-on C-141 Starlifter and the C-17 Globemaster, the U. S. military continues to be a
world leader in the development and use of cargo aircraft.
(7) Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL), “Why Pipelines?” March 25, 2004.
(8) In 2002 the number of U.S. companies acquiring U.S. companies totaled 1, 994. U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, p. 511.

19

(9) Statement of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. before the Surface Transportation Board on November 16,
2000. Mr. Pierce makes essentially the same point with respect to mergers and inefficiencies as
the authors. His entire statement is recommended reading.
(10) Krasner, Jeffery, “Alliances Usually Fail, Study Says,” The Boston Globe (Boston MA)
May 3, 2002. Website Posted by Rod Williams.
(11) Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA 1921,
pp. 239-40.
(12) CONRAIL was established with the passage of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973. It was made up of bankrupt northeast railroads, including the Penn-Central. CONRAIL
was a publicly owned company subsidized under provisions of the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. In 1998 CONRAIL was sold to Norfolk-Southern and CSX.
(13) For example. If a railroad charged $100 to move a ton of commodity Z from X to Y and
variable costs were $50 then the ratio of revenue to variable cost would be 100/50 or a cost ratio
of 200% which would exceed the threshold and presumably be considered unreasonable. The
importance of this ratio rests on economic theory which states that if a firm’s revenue covers its
variable costs in the short run it should remain in business. In the long run revenue must, of
course, cover fixed as well as variable costs. Railroads are a capital intense industry with large
fixed costs.
(14) "Surface Transportation Reports," Decision of the Surface Transportation Board of the
United States (E-Library, STB Reports at http://www.stb.dot.gov).
(15) The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association represents approximately 400
short line and regional railroads. These railroads operate 29 percent of the total U.S. railroad
mileage and account for nine percent of the industry’s freight revenue. (American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association, “Who We Are.”)
(16) Babcock, Michael and Weisman, Dennis. “Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers,”
Southern Economic Journal (April) 2001, pp. 938-954.
(17) Thompson, Louis S., Railway Adviser, to the World Bank. Regulatory Developments in the
U.S.: History and Philosophy March 2000.
(18) Return of equity (ROE) is the shareholders (owners) claim on the assets of the company
plus earnings retained after a dividend is paid. Return on investment (ROI) is the firm’s return on
its net investment.
(19) Provisions of The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 included (a) compensation to shipping
executives could not exceed $25, 000, (b) Subsidized firms were prohibited from owing any
beneficial interest in foreign shipping, (c) subsidized firms could not operate in the protected
domestic trade, (d) The act required minimum sailings on specified routes, (e) Government
controlled entry of other subsidized operators on subsidized routes, (f) government approval
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required for mergers, (g) a part of firm’s profit had to be deposited into a capital trust fund and,
(h) minimum manning, wage, and working conditions specified by Act. At beginning of World
War II, 50 percent of U.S. flag fleet elected not to embrace the Act. By 1959 all eligible firms
had applied for subsidy. Lesson learned is that an industry divided between government
subsidized firms and non-subsidized firms cannot endure.
(20) Association of American Railroads, Policy and Economics Department, “Railroad
Profitability.” July, 2003.
(21) Standard & Poor Stock Report (Norfolk Southern). Sub-Industry: Railroads. January 17, 2004.
(22) Keeler, Theodore E., Railroads, Freight, and Public Policy, Brookings Institution
(Washington, D.C.) 1983, p. 17.
(23) Whitehurst, Clinton H., Jr. (Ed.) Forming Multimodal Transportation Companies: Barriers,
Benefits, and Problems. American Enterprise Institute (Washington D.C.) 1978. pp 73-141.
(24) Examples of then and present multimodal transportation companies include: Southern
Pacific, trucking and pipelines; American Commercial Barge Line, natural gas pipeline and a
motor carrier; Southern Railway, barge line and trucking firm; Sea Land, trucking firm.
(25) A necessary condition to a two railroad scenario is a Surface Transportation Board with the
same regulatory authority it commands at present. However, in the event of a final set of rail
mergers it is likely that rail shippers will insist on an enhanced overview authority with respect to
rates and service.
(26) The Transportation Act of 1920 directed the ICC to draw up a national rail map. Rail
mergers in accordance with the map would be viewed sympathetically by the ICC. No railroad
accepted the offer.
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ADDENDUM
Over time, there will probably be fewer large airlines . . . . . . . .Downsizing, merging with
another large airline or folding could be inevitable for some legacy carriers, said Paul Biederman
who teaches about the airline industry at New York University. There will be one or two big
ones left then you will have medium size ones like Southwest and AirTran, and then the regional
carriers, Biederman said. It's going to happen by hook or by crook, either by voluntary merger
or bankruptcy.
Harry R. Weber
The Associated Press
July 17, 2004
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